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Abstract Mental time travel refers to the ability of an organism to project herself
backward and forward in time, using episodic memory and imagination to simulate
past and future experiences. The evolution of mental time travel gives humans a
unique capacity for prospection: the ability to pre-experience the future. Discussions
of mental time travel treat it as an instance of explicit prospection. We argue that
implicit simulations of past and future experience can also be used as a way of
gaining information about the future to shape preferences and guide behaviour.
Keywords Mental time travel  Somatic marker hypothesis 
Implicit processes  Iowa gambling task  Prospection
In mental time travel we review past and preview future experiences. This is a
crucial cognitive adaptation for humans, tied to the evolution of the prefrontal
cortex, which allows us to simulate possible futures when deliberating. The concept
of mental time travel understood as a distinct cognitive process with a specialised
neural substrate is now supported by convergent evidence from the neurosciences of
memory, imagination, planning and decision-making. As Schacter et al. put it: ‘‘the
medial temporal lobe system which has long been considered to be crucial for
remembering the past might actually gain adaptive value through its ability to
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provide details that serve as building blocks of future event simulations’’ (Schacter
et al. 2007, p. 659; See also Addis et al. 2007; Schacter and Addis 2007b Buckner
and Carroll 2007; Busby and Suddendorf 2005; Hassabis and Maguire 2007; Spreng
et al. 2009; Suddendorf and Corballis 2007, Suddendorf et al. 2009. See Szpunar
2010 for a comprehensive review of the hypothesis that episodic memory and
imagination, are both constructive processes which depend on the same neural
systems).
The extent to which mental time travel is unique to humans is controversial. It is
tested in scenarios that involve episodic memory and prospection such as perceptual
recollection, planning and decision-making, or detected in situations in which the
mind reverts to daydreaming or mindwandering (Christoff et al. 2009; Greicius et al.
2003; Mason et al. 2007). Typically in such cases human subjects can describe their
experience and the content of the imagery involved. Not only that but convergent
evidence from neuroscience supports the idea that what the brain is doing in these
cases is simulating episodes of personal experience.
When, however, we turn our attention to highly intelligent primates and birds and
to pre or barely verbal infants, determining the nature and content of cognitive
processes and experiences is not straightforward. Consider, for example, Santino the
chimpanzee who hoards rocks to throw at visitors to his enclosure. Is he
remembering previous episodes of harassment and imagining banishing future
voyeurs? What is going in the mind of chimpanzees who will not retrieve food while
observed by a dominant male (Call and Tomasello 2008)? Scrub jays cache food for
winter and will re-cache it if observed by other jays (Clayton and Dickinson 1998;
Clayton et al. 2003; Dally et al. 2006) Are they recalling previous thefts and
anticipating a hungry future? These are instances of intelligent future-directed
behaviour that seem to involve the representation of information about past and
future contingencies unavailable in the current experience. Purely stimulus-bound
creatures could not produce these behaviours. However the intelligence of the
behaviour could be a product of a combination of associative learning, semantic
memory and complex environmental scaffolding (Brass and Heyes 2005; Heyes
1998, 2010; Shettleworth 2010).
Clearly, if scrub jays and chimpanzees are engaged in mental time travel then
their behaviour is easily explained. But the consensus is that they are not mental
time travellers. Their behaviour across a range of domains and evidence about their
neurocognitive architectures do not support the idea that they are capable of explicit
prospection: the simulation of a future experience to guide decision-making
(Roberts and Feeney 2009). Of course their capacity for mental time travel may be
limited to specific ecological contexts: but that creates another puzzle. Why would a
capacity (simulation) that is essentially stimulus independent and confers such
adaptive advantages be used in such a restricted way?
Other interesting and difficult cases are raised by infant and toddler cognition.
Pre schoolers are capable of future-directed cognition in limited contexts but
whether they are in fact able to sample past and future experiences in imagination
and memory is a difficult question. There is a lot of evidence to suggest that the
preschool child is not able to use mental time travel to control her behaviour until
her prefrontal cortex matures sufficiently to enable explicit simulation of experience
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under a degree of executive control (Fair et al. 2008; Garon et al. 2008; Leslie 1994;
Zelazo and Frye 1998).
Our aim in this paper is to argue that there are forms of prospection that can be
guided by implicit simulation of information represented in past and future
experience. Those implicit simulations are not fully under executive control (as in
adult humans who can, for example, imaginatively rehearse the nausea produced by
the lurching deck and the stench of overflowing toilets when deciding to fly rather
than travel by ferry) but they provide a form of cognitive control which may well be
a precursor of fully fledged mental time travel. Our aim is to make conceptual space
for the possibility of implicit prospection and show that it is at least consistent with
some of the neurocognitive and behavioural evidence. We shall rely on some
evidence that many (not all) cognitive processes involving the construction of
explicit representations depend on prior stages of implicit processing which
represent information at coarser levels of grain in order to enable rapid cognitive
and behavioural response. Thus, for example, explicitly recognising a face or place
is the final stage in a process that initially involves implicit recognition. Our claim is
that these ‘‘early’’ implicit forms of representation can play a similar role in decision
making to the role played by explicit representations in mental time travel.
In general we endorse the strategy of not postulating additional representational
complexity where rich environmental structure and well-established cognitive
capacities can account for behavioural complexity. For example creatures (like
toddlers, chimpanzees and scrub jays) who possess semantic knowledge (of facts)
and are capable of affectively-scaffolded associative learning may, in suitably
structured environments show very intelligent future directed behaviour. It could be,
for example, that scrub jays flexible cache-ing behaviour is an associatively learnt
response to conditions of scarcity and population density (thanks to an anonymous
referee for the suggestion). And toddlers may know that a new baby will be arriving
by Christmas time put a present under the tree for her even if they cannot imagine
the nature of siblinghood.
At present one might think that the options for explaining future directed
behaviour consisted in
(i) associative learning plus a rich environment
(ii) semantic knowledge
(iii) combination of (i) and (ii)
(iv) fully-fledged mental time travel in which episodes of experience are simulated
(v) explicit reasoning
Clearly (iv) and (v) represent distinctly human abilities not present in infants but
certainly present in primary schoolers.
We note that, given that mental time travel exists as a sophisticated cognitive
adaptation, it would be surprising if it did not have one or more less sophisticated
precursors, ontogenetically or phylogenetically. Equally, given that explicit
reasoning does not arrive as an all or nothing ability but has a developmental
pathway it also has some precursor stages. Our idea is that a combination of implicit
representation plus less than fully-fledged executive control may provide a capacity
for implicit prospection. We do not see ourselves as postulating additional cognitive
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mechanisms or processes to account for behaviour that can be accounted for in other
ways. Rather we see ourselves as directing attention to a role for implicit cognitive
processes that is consistent with evidence about cognitive architecture and
performance. We suggest that implicit mental time travel may be an instance of
the deployment of existing capacities for implicit representation and developing
capacity for executive control to confer cognitive advantages. Our thought is that if
the transition from (iii) to (iv) and (v) is not all or nothing then there may be
behaviours that represent a kind of intermediate developmental stage.
Episodic memory and controlled imagination arrive around the age of four as part
of a suite of executive capacities that provide a capacity for explicit simulation and a
degree of foresight. The capacities of pre-school children for explicit deliberation
and controlled simulation are quite limited. This has been advanced as one reason
why infants younger than about three and a half cannot pass the false belief test,
which requires them to predict where another person will look for an item whose
location has been changed since they last saw it. Interestingly however in ‘‘violation
of expectation’’ and ‘‘anticipatory looking’’ paradigms children as young as
15 months have passed version of the false belief test (Ruffman 2000). All theorists
agree that these tasks involve implicit representation, and many have interpreted
these cases as evidence of implicit representation of the concept of false belief.
Debate continues. For our purposes it is important to note only that that these
children are asked to predict the future based on previous experience and that the
representation of the right location is stimulus independent.
Of course it may be the case that the solution here actually involves (i) (ii) or (iii)
but our point is that it may also involve a precursor stage of the development of (iv)
and (v). That is to say the child implicitly remembers where the object was and uses
that representation to guide predictive behaviour. Executive control at this stage
may consist only in some top down inhibition of stimulus-driven behavioural output
while implicit representations of alternatives are rehearsed before neural activity
settles into a stable pattern that determines output behaviour (Koechlin and
Summerfield 2007). We see instances of this kind of very limited executive control
in cases where response times in decision-making tasks are affected by the
presentation of alternatives with different affective valence. Often the presentation
of alternatives produces an interference effect, a different pattern of neural activity
and slower response time. It is as though alternatives are being tacitly rehearsed
before the choice or decision is made even though the subject cannot explicitly
represent the decision making process (Bowman et al. 2005). If this is the case it
would not be surprising if the lack of executive capacity meant that implicit and
explicit performance on false belief tasks is not consistent in toddlers. Perhaps
toddlers cannot recall, construct, maintain and manipulate an explicit representation
of the relevant information under voluntary control (Stuss and Alexander 2000). The
information is, however, retained, and an implicit representation that guides
reflexive behaviour can be elicited under the right conditions.
If this is the case it would not be surprising if the lack of executive capacity
meant that performance was very limited. Perhaps toddlers cannot recall, construct,
maintain and manipulate an explicit representation of the relevant information under
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voluntary control. The information is, however, retained, and an implicit represen-
tation that guides reflexive behaviour can be elicited under the right conditions.
Such a precursor stage need not actually be a distinct cognitive capacity but might
consist in the way implicit capacities are used in concert with developing capacities for
executive control (Zelazo and Frye 1998). Often cognitive development consists in
being able to make explicit, under full executive control, information, which was
formerly implicit, only partially accessible and controllable. Mapping the concept of
relative magnitude to the counting series in order to grasp the concept of number is an
example. Toddlers are not bad at estimating ‘‘bigger than’’ and counting ‘‘one’’;
‘‘two’’… ‘‘many’’ and they can chant the counting series, but putting the concepts
together by representing something like an infinite number line of regularly spaced
integers is a breakthrough (Sarnecka and Carey 2008; Delazer and Benke 1999). The
point is that before they do that they may exhibit some ‘‘intermediate’’ stage
arithmetical behaviour which represents, not a maturation of a distinct cognitive
adaptation for ‘‘intermediate arithmetic’’, but a stage in the culturally scaffolded
deployment of existing representational capacities en route to an explicit represen-
tation of numbers Sterelny 2011). Part of this stage might consist in good performance
on some counting or estimation tasks accompanied by inability to fully articulate and
control the behaviour via explicit representation. Just as the pre-schooler does well at
implicit false belief tests and poorly at explicit ones.
Such cases should not necessarily be taken as evidence that implicit and explicit
representations of a domain are distinct cognitive capacities (Davies 1987) with
entirely discrete neural substrates, but that explicitness and cognitive control come
in degrees for some conceptual domains (Maia and McClelland 2004, 2005;
Degonda et al. 2005) We give examples in later sections, which we take to be
uncontroversial. We add the idea that the implicit representations in question can
sometimes accessed in the service of future-directed cognition, allowing the subject
to simulate alternative responses in order to guide behaviour. Initially we
concentrate on a hypothetical case of prospection by a prosopagnosic patient. We
discuss alternative interpretations of this case as a way of clarifying the issues. Our
discussion of these alternatives leads to discussion of the relationship between
implicit and explicit simulation in another well-known case, the Iowa gambling task
(IGT). We argue that the IGT may have been misinterpreted as evidence for a dual
process architecture of decision making in which implicit and explicit processing
are conceived of as distinct cognitive processes.
Implicit recognition: the case of faces
Prosopagnosia comes in different forms but the relevant one for us is one in which a
subject can recognise a face qua face and recognise facial features but is unable to
determine whether the face, even of a relative, is familiar to her. Such patients will
produce identical responses when presented with both familiar and unfamiliar faces.
They have associative prosopagnosia in which they are unable to overtly (explicitly)
recognise familiar faces. Nonetheless in some cases lack of explicit recognition is
accompanied by implicit recognition (called covert recognition in the face recognition
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literature). Covert recognition is evidenced by interference and priming effects (the
presence of a familiar face changes behaviour even though subjects are not aware that
they have seen the face before) and skin conductance response (SCR indicative of
autonomic activity prompted by recognition) for familiar faces (Bauer 1984, 1986;
Breen et al. 2000; 2001; De Haan et al. 1987a, 1987b; Young 1994; Tranel and
Damasio 1988a, 1998b; Tranel et al. 1995; Schweinberger and Burton 2003).
Consequently as Young puts it, ‘‘it is inadequate to think of it (prosopagnosia) as
simply involving loss of recognitional mechanisms. Instead, at least some degree of
recognition does take place. What has been lost is awareness of recognition.’’
(quoted by Schweinberger and Burton 2003, p. 284).
Of course what is retained is as important as what is lost in these cases. What is
retained is not simply a conditioned response to familiar faces but the early
information processing on which such responses depend. In other words, the
implicit representation of faces and their consequent emotional significance. (Breen
et al. 2000, 2001). Importantly this affective information surfaces in awareness as a
‘‘feeling’’ rather than a fully explicit verbalisable thought. It thus represents a form
of awareness which is less than fully explicit but which is not absent from
consciousness. Thus SCR to familiar faces should not be interpreted as evidence of
non representational ‘‘mere exposure’’ effects or preferences for familiar stimuli
established by Zajonc. The intact responses of prosopagnosics to familiar faces
depend on the ability to represent faces, or features of faces as familiar. This fact
about the relationship between affective feeling and explicit cognition has led
theorists such Hauser (2006) to describe the role of the ventromedial cortex in
decision making as ‘‘trafficking’’ information from lower level implicit affective
processes to associate it with explicitly represented information.
Although the architecture of the face recognition system is not completely
characterised the following model (see Fig. 1) explains the phenomena we have
described. It describes a series of processes, starting with construction of a structural
description of a face derived from visual input and progressively integrating
information about familiarity and identity, which culminate in explicit recognition.
Importantly amygdala activation, which produces SCR, is a consequence of implicit
recognition in the ventral processing stream.
Thus explicit representation of facial familiarity depends on the prior construc-
tion of implicit representations.
So far we have sought only to establish that there are implicit representations of
faces, facial familiarity and emotional significance of faces.
The next stage of our argument is to show, in principle, that a subject could
implicitly simulate recognising and responding affectively to a familiar face. If such
simulations could be evoked and deployed in the service of future directed actions
the process would be an instance of implicit prospection.
Implicit prospection
Imagine an overtly associative prosopagnosic patient being asked to select dining
companions from a set of photographs of familiar and unfamiliar people. A normal
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person could solve this problem by imagining or recalling sitting next to particular
people and sampling the emotional response. She may of course solve it in other
ways such as activating a conditioned response to a name but assume that she
spends some time visualising alternative possibilities and chooses on the basis of
feelings evoked in the process.
Someone with associative prosopagnosia cannot explicitly represent familiarity
or affective significance of faces. The only resources available to our prosopagnosic
to solve her problem of choosing dining companions for next week are implicit
representations of familiarity and associated affective response.
We think that that nonetheless the prosopagnosic would have some strong
preferences. Familiar to unfamiliar, and friends to enemies for example. And these
preferences would align with her responses to familiar people prior to her injury. In
other words her anticipation of prospects for an enjoyable dinner would be based on
retrieving implicit information from the past in order to simulate the future. The
point is not just that she has an implicit response (behavioural or affective) to
particular people but that she simulates those responses as part of a future directed
decision making process.
We think that this is sufficient to qualify as implicit prospection.
There are different lines of objections to this interpretation. The first is that the
patient’s preferences are not evidence of implicit processing. They are conditioned
responses akin to mere exposure effects or affective responses acquired through
Fig. 1 The face recognition system
Feeling the future 705
123
associative learning. In the former case the response is not affective, in the second
affective but in each case the representational demands are minimal. Our reply to
this objection is that this is in fact why we chose the example of the prosopagnosic.
The model of face recognition which structures research in the area depends on the
idea that familiarity of faces is computed in order to produce the kind of behavioural
effects we are interested in. In other words the relevant information is implicitly
represented. The same patterns of activation in the FRU which produce priming and
interference are required to produce preferences. At the very least the subject must
be able to implicitly recognise the face.
A deeper objection is that while the patient does make use of implicit
representation of faces the process is not one of implicit simulation. If this true then
the decision making in question is not sufficiently analogous to mental time travel to
count as implicit prospection.
The Iowa gambling task. associative learning or implicit prospection?
We note however that this second objection runs counter to standard interpretations
of important experiments on future directed cognition. Perhaps the most famous of
these is the performance of patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex on the IGT. In the IGT subjects draw cards that prescribe a financial reward
or punishment (lose or gain money) from four decks. Each deck has a different
pattern of gains and losses: the ‘‘punishment schedule’’. Typically after a learning
period subject’s choices come to reflect the punishment schedules even before they
are able to explicitly articulate those schedules. (Damasio et al. 1991; Bechara et al.
1996; Dunn et al. 2006).
The salient points are:
(i) normal subjects preferences align with punishment schedules
(ii) normal subjects exhibit ‘‘anticipatory SCR’’ for adverse decks
(iii) patients with ventromedial prefrontal damage do not adjust their choices to
reflect the punishment schedules
(iv) even after they can explicitly represent the schedules
(v) patients with ventromedial prefrontal damage do not exhibit anticipatory SCR
The somatic marker hypothesis was proposed to explain why ventromedial
patients who show a deficit in personal decision-making do not seem to exhibit an
anticipatory SCR prior to explicit decision-making. The basic idea is that idea is that
the emotional significance of stimuli is implicitly represented and guides choice in
the absence of explicit representation. Somatic markers are a form of implicit
emotional memory postulated to allow one to decide advantageously before
(explicitly) knowing the advantageous strategy (Damasio et al. 1991).
Ventromedial patients in contrast cannot generate aversive SCRs and do not seem
to learn from experience. Their choices remain unconstrained even after they can
explicitly articulate the punishment schedule for each deck.
The crucial point is that the SCR’s in question are interpreted as ‘‘anticipatory’’.
That is as guides to future action. This is why these studies are recruited part of the
706 P. Gerrans, D. Sander
123
prospection literature. They are evidence that decision making depends on
simulation of future affective response by reconstructing a previous one.
If the IGT is an instance of prospection then our example of a prosopagnosic
choosing among dinner companions is equally an instance of prospection.
We note that someone might insist that both the IGT and our example are not
really prospective since the stimulus is present. In that case we suggest changing the
example to imagining having dinner or drawing from the relevant deck. The
example then becomes ‘‘Imagine dining with X, Y or Z, or drawing from deck A, B
or C. What is your preference?’’. If the somatic marker hypothesis is correct then a
ventromedial patient would have no preferences because she could not associate an
affective response with the symbolic representation of the options (X,Y,Z; A,B,C).
This is correct but why?
We think that the somatic marker hypothesis suggests that the problem is solved
by triggering sufficient of the early implicit responses involved to generate an
autonomic response that then structures preferences. Of course the person may not
be able to make the preference structure fully explicit because she has incomplete
access to the representations which generated it. In that sense she is in a similar
situation to the prosopagnosic who has preferences for faces she cannot articulate.
Why should we not call this a case of implicit prospection? Cleary it is not fully
fledged mental time travel because all the relevant information is not explicitly
represented. But relevant implicit information is represented. Furthermore the case
is not simply a case of associative learning or mere exposure effects because the
stimulus is no longer present. The autonomic response is modulated by the
representation of emotionally salient information (Crone et al. 2004). It is true that
the decision making process is triggered by a verbal representation but the very fact
that a verbal representation can serve as a trigger suggests a degree of stimulus
independence. After all, the subject was conditioned by initial experience, not the
word or name.
A study by Tomb et al. (2002) supports the idea that explicitness comes in
degrees. Tomb et al. divided 200 participants in the IGT into high, moderate and
low performing groups based on results. Interestingly, only in the high performing
group were anticipatory SCRs as predicted by the somatic marker hypothesis. This
suggests that some subjects (the moderate group) can learn the schedule without
developing anticipatory SCR. If this is the case, and explicit knowledge is not the
cause, then implicit information must be playing a crucial role. It is the equivalent of
the prospagnosic being able to choose dinner companions without being able to give
a rationale.
Tomb and collaborators take this case to support the idea that progressive
acquisition of explicit knowledge is the basis of success in the IGT i.e. that the
difference between good and moderate performers consists in the degree of explicit
knowledge. We do not have to endorse that conclusions to note that their
explanation suggests that implicit representation precedes explicit and that SCR
depends on implicit representation (see Dunn et al. 2006, p. 250). By the time the
subjects can explicitly represent the schedule their implicit representations and
affective responses are consistent.
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The upshot for the theory of implicit prospection is that if an organism can
generate and use those implicit representations in the absence of the stimulus she is
effectively remembering or imagining the represented object. Furthermore if she
can do so in the service of future-oriented action she is in effect performing an act of
implicit prospection.
Conclusion
We have not argued that implicit prospection exists as a distinct cognitive capacity
like language or memory. Rather, like its big brother mental time travel, it consists
of the ability to recruit pre-existing cognitive capacities in the service of future
directed cognition. Mental time travel recruits episodic memory and imagination,
explicit forms of representation, under voluntary control, to assist with deliberation.
Pascal Boyer has suggested that this enables us to avoid catastrophic discounting of
the future by projecting ourselves forward in time. We can feel the future as well as
think about it by rehearsing future episodes of our autobiography. As he points out,
people with ventromedial damage who are hostage to their stimulus driven impulses
effectively ‘‘discount the future’’ but the way they do so is interesting. They do have
propositional knowledge about the future, they know the punishment schedules in
the IGT for example, but that knowledge does not affect their behaviour because it
cannot override the motivational salience of the current stimulus. In order to escape
the present we need to be able, not just to have semantic knowledge about future
contingencies, but to sample the relevant experiences by rehearsing salient affective
features of previous encounters.
There is another sense then in which the ventromedial patients are not
discounting the future at all because they are not representing the present and the
future in the same way: as affectively and motivationally salient. Mental time travel
allows the costs of alternative actions to be calculated in the same affective currency
by allowing the future to be ‘‘felt’’ as well as thought.
The ability to feel alternative futures however may not be something that always
involves the ability to fully rehearse all aspects of the relevant experience under
executive control. It might consist only in sustaining a period of indecision
sufficient to allow processes of implicit representation to determine a preference
ranking. The point is just that as long as all the options are not currently perceptible
then such a process cannot be described as a merely conditioned response.
What would an implicit version of mental time travel look like? A creature who
could do it would be able to represent future contingencies and develop preferences
about them in virtue of activating implicit representations of those contingencies
and their affective consequences. The creature would have adaptive future directed
behaviour in virtue of information not present in the current environment. The
behaviour would have to depend on something more cognitively sophisticated than
associative learning and semantic memory.
It these requirements on implicit prospection seem weak we think that this is a
virtue of the account. Phylogenetically and ontogenetically it is highly unlikely that
the ability to project a rich explicit representation of a self in time arrives fully
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formed. The idea that mental time travel is preceded by some form of implicit
prospection fits with the idea that explicitness and the ability to make use of it
comes in degrees.
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